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Introduction
Richmond, Virginia, is seldom central to the narrative of the American
civil rights movement or pointed out in studies of twentieth-century urban
history. Yet in June 1980 Ebony magazine featured the Commonwealth
of Virginia’s capital in an article entitled “Richmond: Former Confederate Capital Finally Falls to Blacks.” The column documented the arrival
of black governance in what was once the industrial capital of slave-based
tobacco production and the home of the Confederacy. Richmond activist Curtis Holt Sr. was at the center of the Ebony article. In 1971, Holt,
armed with a tenth-grade education, walked into a federal office in Richmond and filed a suit against the city under the authority of the Voting
Rights Act (VRA) of 1965. According to Holt, Richmond’s white leaders
had in 1969 purposefully diluted the collective power of the city’s black
voters by annexing portions of Chesterfield County, a primarily white and
affluent suburb contiguous to Richmond. Vote dilution, Holt charged,
cost him a seat on the city council during the election of 1970. Few knew
it at the time, but Holt’s contentions would transform municipal politics
in Richmond. His lawsuit was part of a much larger voting rights revolution that changed the meaning of representative democracy in America.1
In 1972, Holt’s suit led a federal district court to use the VRA’s preclearance clause in section 5 to place a moratorium on Richmond City
Council elections. This moratorium lasted until the U.S. Supreme Court
and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) determined whether the
annexation of Chesterfield County had indeed diluted—the process of
diminishing a group’s ability to elect candidates of their choice—blacks’
votes by adding nearly 44,000 white suburban residents to the city. The
suspension of the city council elections lasted for roughly seven years.
Although the Court eventually upheld the annexation, it demanded in
return that Richmonders abandon at-large elections and implement an
electoral system that allowed African Americans, who represented more
than 50 percent of Richmond’s total population prior to the boundary
expansion, to vote within almost exclusively black districts. Racial redis1
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tricting led immediately to the election of a five-to-four black-majority
council (BMC) in 1977 and the appointment of a nationally celebrated
civil rights lawyer, Henry L. Marsh III, to the mayoralty.2
Roughly twelve years after Congress passed the VRA, the former capital of the Confederacy had fallen again. African Americans seemed to
have political control over a city whose foremost tourist attraction, Monument Avenue, was and continues to be a street lined with statues honoring Confederate leaders. By the early 1980s, the commonwealth’s capital
was one of thirteen U.S. cities with populations greater than 100,000 to
be controlled by a black city council, mayor, and administration. Ebony
argued that Holt, a resident of Richmond’s Creighton Court housing
projects who was generally unkempt and “misplaced infinitives and mispronounced words,” seemed an unlikely candidate to transform a city’s
political landscape—especially a city that had played such a pivotal role in
perpetuating oppression of African Americans. But Holt, the historical
record demonstrates, had not done it alone.3
Richmond, Virginia, founded in 1737 by William Byrd II on the
James River fall line, was fundamental to the formation of both American liberty and American slavery. On one hand, Richmond is inextricably linked to the establishment of American independence. Patrick Henry
delivered the celebrated “Liberty or Death” speech atop Church Hill at
St. John’s Church in 1775. Lawmakers signed Thomas Jefferson’s Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom at Richmond’s temporary state capital building in 1786. Some of the loudest cries for American liberty and
home rule during the revolutionary era came not only from New England and Pennsylvania but from Virginia as well. Ambivalent political and
economic traditions also characterize Richmond’s history. English colonials eventually transformed Richmond and the Tidewater Region of Virginia into a tobacco-producing powerhouse during the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. As European demand for tobacco increased, local
tobacco growers and manufacturers came to rely almost exclusively on
the process of slavery, and slavery made a handful of Virginians extremely
wealthy. These Virginians, historian Edmund Morgan contends, “bought
their independence with slave labor” and tobacco production.4
Slavery and segregation shaped Richmond’s development well into
the twentieth century. During the antebellum period, industrial slavery in
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Richmond gave rise to limited freedoms for blacks, and these freedoms
had a profound influence on future generations of black Richmonders.
Not only was Virginia central to domestic slave trading, but Richmond’s
tobacco factories, flour mills, pig iron production, railways, and canal systems also represented “the most advanced economic developments in the
antebellum South.” Many of these industries relied almost exclusively on
slave labor by the mid–nineteenth century. A considerable number of the
city’s slaves worked in tobacco factories—a multi-million-dollar industry
by 1860—on or near the James River’s canal system. There were so many
black tobacco workers, historians now know, that employers were often
forced to provide “board money” for slaves’ lodging. Slaves’ accommodations, which were often near the point of production yet apart from
slave owners, nurtured personal and communal autonomy. These areas
eventually gave rise to strong church-based, economic, and family ties
that survived both the Confederacy’s impressment of slave labor during the Civil War and the incremental rise of Jim Crow segregation. In
1901–1902, white powerbrokers countered blacks’ demands for independence by drafting a new state constitution that authorized the use
of poll taxes and literacy tests. Poll taxes worked—wealthy whites were
overrepresented in Virginia’s governing bodies until the mid–twentieth
century. Nearly a century after the Civil War, around 1956, an organization of well-heeled black professionals called the Richmond Crusade for
Voters set out to secure black Richmonders’ rights as American citizens
by paying these levies. Curtis Holt may have been the centerpiece of the
Ebony article in 1980, but the Crusade was the engine that drove racial
politics in Richmond.5
No civic organization did more to democratize local politics in twentieth-century Richmond than the Crusade. The story told in this book
describes more than thirty years of national and local politics. It explains
how local suffragists pressed federal officials to strengthen the VRA and
redistribute southern political authority along racial lines. The rights
embodied in the VRA cannot be explained by separating the mobilization of black voters on one hand and federal policy directed toward race
on the other. Richmond’s African Americans, who watched segregationists use municipal government and New Deal programs to raise whites’
standard of living (often at the expense of black communities), skipped
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the protest portion of the freedom struggle and went straight to politics. They eventually seized political leadership from gradualist African
American ministers in the late 1950s, registered thousands of black voters, and challenged white elites’ ascendancy over local politics during the
early 1960s. The Crusade, led by men and women alike, influenced local
politics nearly a decade before the VRA and decades before the Supreme
Court mandated the city’s majority–minority district system. These types
of pre-VRA suffrage crusades—not just civil disobedience and mass protests—raised political consciousness in black communities across America
and eventually generated the momentum necessary for Congress to pass
the VRA. The VRA may have given rise to dramatic changes in American political culture, but it also fell short of eliminating, according to
Supreme Court justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “all vestiges of discrimination against the exercise of the franchise by minority citizens.” The
Crusade ushered in a period of profound political promise, but it also witnessed the rise of an era characterized by new political restrictions.6
This book is not merely a triumph narrative about Richmond’s contribution to the long struggle for black freedom but also a cautionary
tale about a city coming to terms with the continuation of racist political trends in American life after 1965. The VRA had unintended consequences. As the members of groups such as the Crusade transitioned
from protest to politics after 1965, their white counterparts embarked on
a Machiavellian crusade of their own: vote dilution and political obstructionism. White leaders, who had grown accustomed to restricting and
granting freedoms, remained convinced that African Americans lacked
the intellectual capacity to manage municipal affairs. As black elected officials assumed control over America’s city halls, they often had to resolve
social problems left over from the racist policies of the mid–twentieth
century. The Crusade, its representatives, and black communities across
the United States had inherited what political scientist H. Paul Friesema
in 1969 called a “hollow prize.” If annexation led immediately to the
district system in 1977, the very forces that made Richmond’s majority–minority district system possible—an increase in African American
populations in densely packed enclaves, unremitting residential segregation, white flight, and an unmistakable pattern of urban retrenchment—
were the same forces that brought about deepening marginalization and
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dispossession in black communities during the twilight of the twentieth
century. Although African Americans maintained a city council majority throughout the 1980s, Ebony could not have written a triumph narrative about black governance in Richmond in 1985. White resistance to
black governance crested at the very moment that black-majority cities in
America were overcome by deepening demographic and economic crises.
By 1985, preoccupation with poverty and public safety impinged upon
the Crusade’s strictly political approach to black equality. African Americans, who circled the race wagons in the 1960s, no longer agreed on how
to solve their communities’ problems.7
In telling the story of the civil rights movement in Richmond, this book
connects three subjects: (1) how middle-class African Americans used
politics as a means to empower their communities; (2) how local people
helped influence national voting rights policy during the civil rights movement; and (3) how race and racism shaped policy and politics in Richmond
well into the twentieth century. This account of Richmond’s role in the
civil rights movement is first and foremost about politics: it explains how
people used civic organizations, electoral politics, litigation, media, and
other tactics to influence public policy and reclaim black citizenship from
the clutches of white supremacy. It also explains the unintended consequences of that reclamation. After decades of studying the ways everyday
people shaped the quest for civil rights, experts now have a much firmer
understanding, as historian Emilye Crosby contends, of “what and who
we think” are important to the freedom struggle. In connecting local and
national matters, this story’s chronology demonstrates that pre–Brown
v. Board of Education (1954) voter mobilization and national enthusiasm for integration gave rise not only to massive resistance but also to a
specific type of civil rights activism in Richmond. Recent accounts of the
American civil rights movement demonstrate that national and international events profoundly influenced not merely the movement, but public
policy. These accounts also confirm that local people worked within the
context of local circumstances to create the conditions necessary to challenge Jim Crow. Black Richmonders were ruthlessly committed to the
political aspects of the freedom struggle. African American women, working poor, public-housing residents, and middle-class technocrats spent
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the mid- to late twentieth century defining and redefining the meaning
of American citizenship.8
The Richmond Crusade for Voters did not emerge from thin air: its
members inherited a drawn-out struggle against Virginia’s culture of racist civility. Three specific factors gave rise to the Crusade: Richmond’s
legacy of gradualist leadership, growing momentum for voting rights
mandates before 1965, and Virginia’s history of racist paternalism. John
Brooks, Lola Hamilton, Dr. William Ferguson Reid, Ethel T. Overby, and
Dr. William S. Thornton created the Crusade in 1956 to combat massive resistance to public-school integration. The Crusade had immediate
roots in African American gradualism and the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). Before the mid-1950s,
limited interracial cooperation characterized Richmond’s color line—the
story of how black leaders collaborated with a handful of moderate white
elites to hammer out solutions to various grievances is now well known.
Although whites often dictated the terms of racial improvements, they
relied on a “better class of black leaders to counsel prudence and ensure
that change” occurred within the context of white paternalism. Yet even
within this context of racist civility, African American leaders continued to
challenge the boundaries of racial segregation in Richmond. Richmond
not only elected Oliver W. Hill to the city council in 1948 but also—
roughly one hundred miles south of the nation’s capital—became a “beehive” for the NAACP’s desegregation lawsuits during the early 1950s. As
whites manufactured massive resistance to public-school integration, the
Crusade revolted against poll taxes and black ministers who supported
only moderate racial reforms. The Crusade believed that the racial polarization brought on by the Brown decision called for more robust political
organization. It not only had the financial resources to create a self-sustaining network of precinct-based groups but also mobilized to pay others’ poll taxes, registered thousands of black voters, and raised political
consciousness with the help of the area’s black newspaper, the Richmond
Afro-American & Planet. By 1964, the Crusade facilitated the election of
an African American, B. A. “Sonny” Cephas, to the city council and was
instrumental in shaping local policy.9
The maelstrom that followed the Brown decision and the rise of directaction demonstrations often overshadows the story of African Americans’
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“re-enfranchisement.” The Crusade was part of—and essential to—the
larger voting rights movement taking place below the Mason–Dixon line
before 1965. The idea that African Americans were not voting at all in the
South prior to 1965 is a popular misconception about the freedom struggle. This notion also belies the data. In 1956, one million of the South’s
roughly five million African Americans had registered to vote. In their
search for the civil rights movement’s origins, scholars have demonstrated
that black Americans in cities such as Atlanta, Louisville, Wilmington,
and as far south as Sunflower County, Mississippi, not only drew from
organizing traditions that often predated the 1930s but also parlayed the
urgency from World War II and Brown into voter mobilization movements. It is difficult to understand how local people and organizations
such as the Crusade changed national voting rights policy without examining the voter mobilization campaigns that predated 1965. After Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1957, which was largely about voting
rights, both the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and
the NAACP committed themselves to voter registration.10
The Crusade’s voter mobilization campaigns force us to reimagine
the Brown-to-Selma narrative of the civil rights movement. Not only
did national civil rights organizations such as the SCLC and NAACP
capitalize on indigenous political movements, but the struggle between
black mobilization and vested white political interests also provided the
basis for what became the VRA. The NAACP’s executive secretary, Roy
Wilkins, made Crusade member John Brooks the national organization’s voter registration director in 1958. Brooks and a handful of southern organizers single-handedly orchestrated the NAACP’s “Miracle of
1960”—a campaign to register three million African Americans before
1960 that has received scant attention from historians. Martin Luther
King Jr., the SCLC, and the events that culminated in Selma, Alabama,
during the summer of 1965 certainly motivated President Lyndon B.
Johnson to sign a voting rights bill. Yet Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach and federal policy makers in fact wrote the provisions of the
VRA to preclude the types of disenfranchisement that Brooks, organizations such as the Crusade, and national civil rights organizations had
encountered during the late 1950s and early 1960s. In telling the story
of black Richmonders’ pursuit of the ballot, this book demonstrates that
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local people inspired national civil rights organizations to lobby for voting rights.11
The Crusade’s struggle for political power would not have been possible without the organizational and political will of Richmond’s black
women. The historical record on women’s involvement in the Crusade’s
founding is not commensurate with the historical reality: women and
gender were fundamental to the organization’s formation and preservation. “History of the Crusade: Report of the Historian”—in particular the section on the Crusade’s founding—is guilty of the same “sin of
omission” that too often characterizes what the late Julian Bond called
“the master narrative” of the civil rights movement. Recent community
studies of the freedom struggle have dismantled this master narrative by
demonstrating the myriad contributions women made to the movement
as both secondary figures and leaders. Women, we know now, were more
than matrons of the movement. In their recent examinations of race in
Richmond, scholars such as Lewis Randolph, Gayle Tate, and Caroline
Emmons demonstrate that women played a critical yet unsung role during the fight for voting and civil rights. The Crusade’s first meetings took
place in Ethel T. Overby’s home, and by the late 1950s Overby and the
Crusade transformed people’s homes into a type of cottage industry for
voter mobilization activity. This story of racial politics in Richmond is
not just about men’s and women’s roles but also about how expectations of manhood and womanhood shaped the struggle for civil rights in
Richmond.12
Black women held positions of actual influence within the Crusade,
helped transition from protest to politics, and led the way into elected
office. The Ethel Overbys of the movement—Overby was the first black
public-school principal in Richmond, led the fight against whites’ massive resistance to integration and equal political rights, cofounded the
Crusade, and was its finance chair—existed on a long continuum of
black women in Richmond specifically and Virginia generally (i.e., Maggie Walker and Barbara Johns) who initiated the fight against segregated
transportation and education well before the late 1950s. Much has been
made of the ways patriarchy, masculine histrionics, and the politics of
moral suasion informed civil rights leadership. We know now that the
movement’s men often relegated women to secondary work. Middle-
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class civil rights organizations, historian Barbara Ransby argues, “emphasized the primacy of women’s domestic roles.” National stories of black
voter mobilization often emphasized male leadership because men were
often the movement’s most visible representatives. Men were often political spokespersons and the first elected officials. But community studies of the civil rights movement shed light on a different story. Women
struggled with patriarchy and secondary roles. While a great number of
middle-class women in the Crusade were what the anthropologist Karen
Sacks calls “center-women”—women of status who took on the roles of
informal leadership—a handful floated between the all too familiar binary
spaces of leadership and followership. These women—for instance, Richmond’s first black councilwoman, Willie J. Dell—were the Crusade’s
“bridge leaders.” As African Americans moved into electoral politics,
women—who often worked directly with vulnerable communities as
social workers and activists—bridged the divide between vulnerable communities, grassroots organizing, and official political power. As poverty
deepened throughout Richmond’s black communities, these women also
led the charge against middle-class political leadership.13
The ways white southerners controlled race relations also influenced
the types of civil rights movements that emerged in Richmond and postwar
America. On one hand, Virginia’s poll tax, not threats of mob violence,
dictated who voted in the commonwealth. Richmond’s African Americans used voter mobilization to challenge Jim Crow because Virginia’s
white powerbrokers, under the auspices of Senator Harry F. Byrd and his
reputed “machine,” allowed some blacks to vote well before 1965. Byrd’s
Democratic machine also maintained segregation through paternalistic
elitism rather than through violent rigidity. It is difficult to understand
how Virginia’s African Americans organized civil rights strategies without
recognizing how the commonwealth’s white elites, who embraced segregation but rejected maintaining the color line by force, sustained their
age-old skepticism of broad-based democracy by practicing a regionally
specific brand of racist civility and genteel paternalism. Before Brown,
Richmond’s white elites maintained segregation by handing out piecemeal concessions to gradualist black leaders. Byrd engineered racial solidarity around the issue of massive resistance to public-school integration,
and the racial polarization brought on by massive resistance undermined
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both the commonwealth’s “friendly” race relations and a significant number of gradualist black ministers (which is largely why professionals rather
than ministers led the freedom struggle in Richmond). When it came to
black voting, Byrd Democrats knew they could pay lip service to limited black political participation without conceding substantive political
power. Yet even Byrd understood that if more blacks paid poll taxes, they
might swing the balance of power in local elections because the levies also
suppressed large white voter turnout. The Crusade eventually confirmed
Byrd’s fears.14
Massive resistance to public-school integration may have brought
an end to the practice of maintaining segregation by promoting friendly
race relations, but it did little, this book demonstrates, to extricate white
elites from positions of entrenched power. Richmond’s white establishment maintained its paternalistic proclivities well into the 1980s. The VRA
and the abolition of state and local poll taxes in Harper v. Virginia Board
of Elections (1966) not only reenergized the Crusade but also crystallized
white resistance.15 Crusade members and their allies on the city council
spent the late 1960s fighting against police brutality, urban-renewal projects, and the construction of two expressways. In time, white officials came
to associate the Crusade’s demands with the Black Power movement. After
1965, white leaders advocated for interracial cooperation while secretly
devising color-blind structural barriers (i.e., annexations) that prohibited
blacks from assuming real political power. These barriers affirmed some
Virginians’ belief that good government was still synonymous with elite
whiteness. Federal policy makers and the Supreme Court disagreed.
This book also examines the complex coalitions and litigation that emerged
during the late 1960s as African Americans fought to preserve the VRA.
American cities labored to negotiate the friction between their history
of oppressing blacks and their openness to progressive political reforms.
After 1965, Richmond was part of a much larger revolution in voting
rights. Curtis Holt’s claim that annexation diluted blacks’ votes ran Richmond right into a national voting rights revolution. This so-called reapportionment revolution, which local litigants started, Earl Warren’s Court
accommodated, and Warren Burger’s Court strengthened, went beyond
safeguarding access to the suffrage. As whites devised structural barriers
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to dilute the voting power of recently enfranchised African Americans,
federal officials began to protect a minority group’s right to elect preferred representatives in a manner that was commensurate with their total
voting-age population. The Supreme Court, using an employment-based
affirmative-action remedy known as “disparate-impact analysis,” eventually recognized that the discriminatory effect of electoral laws mattered
just as much as the discriminatory intent. Although the Court struggled
to find a solution to vote dilution, it found that a “presence of factors,”
known as the “totality of circumstances” test, made it difficult for minority
voters to elect more than a handful of public officials. White officials combined white and black districts, relocated polling places to white neighborhoods, threatened economic reprisals against black voters and candidates,
switched to at-large election systems, and, in the Deep South, continued to intimidate voters with violence. National policy makers and the
Supreme Court, which acknowledged that resistance to the VRA might
be characterized as undemocratic, came to prefer majority–minority districts as a solution to vote dilution. Racial redistricting not only protected
a minority group’s right to elect candidates but also allowed minority voters to elect preferred candidates free of white interference.16
The political abuses of electoral reforms have been a continuous and
unfortunate feature of U.S. political history, and politics following the
VRA was no exception to this rule. The United States, experts contend,
often sways back and forth between greater political access and more
political restrictions. We know a great deal about the personal motives of
high-ranking political figures who were integral to passing and strengthening the civil rights bills. Recent assaults on key provisions in the VRA
and the reemergence of direct disenfranchisement have forced scholars to
move beyond portraying voting rights mandates as a triumph narrative.
If officials implemented majority–minority districts during the 1970s to
counteract machinations such as Richmond’s annexation of Chesterfield
County, they also designed these districts to “redress present, institutionalized manifestations of historical injustices against blacks as a group.”
The story of how Washington preserved the spirit of the civil rights bills
is outlined in the pages to come, but it has also been well documented by
scholars and historians of voting rights.17
Institutional political stability between Congress, the Supreme
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Court, and the federal executive branch became critical to the preservation of the Second Reconstruction. In many ways, white resistance to the
VRA and the documentation of that opposition by the U.S. Commission
on Civil Rights had an unintended consequence. As African Americans
transformed the civil rights movement from “protest to politics,” from
right to reality, whites continued to design rules, such as annexations,
that appeared on their face to deny no one the right to vote. Majority–
minority districts—the crowning achievement of the so-called reapportionment revolution—gave rise to an unprecedented, albeit brief, period
of explicitly defined racial politics in the United States. This racial democracy, by diversifying southern and American politics, seemed at that time
to represent a durable shift in American governing authority.18
Washington’s commitment to preserving the civil rights bills also
had unintended consequences for the future of African American associationalism. The federal government’s protection of Great Society legislation during the late 1960s and 1970s convinced men such as Curtis
Holt, for better or worse, to hedge their bets against institutional bigotry
with the liberal state. Black southerners knew that state and local governing bodies were, as historian Thomas Sugrue argues, “the key architects
of racial inequality” and executors of Jim Crowism. In many ways, “the
smaller the government, the more black support for it eroded.” As President Johnson championed an “equality of results” standard—the belief
that civil rights laws needed to engender a proportional share of results
such as employment, office holding, resources, and so on—African Americans came to believe that the federal government was “a positive agent
for social change.” After 1965, many civil rights advocates defended the
value of their hard-won right to vote not by protesting or demonstrating but by working quietly within the democratic system. As we shall see,
sustained resistance to the VRA led the freedom struggle to revert to
the legal and political strategies that helped define the movement before
the Montgomery bus boycott. During the late 1960s and 1970s, a deluge of litigation (fifty cases or more) concerning vote dilution inundated
state and federal court systems. Civil rights laws, according to leading
scholars of Black Power, moderated the movement by convincing African
Americans to lodge their grievances against racism in Washington. This
transition away from extrainstitutional forms of community mobilization
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toward a greater reliance on federal protections was evident not just in
the War on Poverty, as experts have demonstrated, but also in the case of
voting rights. For people such as Curtis Holt, the reapportionment revolution was evidence that federal officials had finally embraced the centrality of race in American politics.19
As black governance supplanted registration drives, contention over
racial politics and redistricting was often most pronounced at the local
level. Racial politics after 1965 was not a southern matter exclusively. As
scholars expand the field of twentieth-century urban history, we know
now that few cities with sizeable black populations were immune to rising
anxiety over Black Power. The fear of a black takeover rose in cities that
witnessed actual racial unrest in the late 1960s, and whites often accused
blacks of extremism even in cities where African Americans had few connections to the Black Power movement. Black Richmonders, who elected
three African Americans to city council in 1966, took an almost strictly
political approach to the freedom struggle. By 1968, working-class and
working-poor African Americans as well as the new generation of young
activists (drawing from Richmond’s sit-in movement of the early 1960s)
were exhausted by the pace of racial reforms. The annexation of Chesterfield County confirmed their weariness. Not only was annexation a panic
reaction to the possibility that blacks might assume control over city hall
in 1970, but many white elites also came to believe that black governance
was synonymous with government for blacks only. Racial redistricting
and the BMC exacerbated these anxieties. White opposition to voter protections grew even more intense as districts guaranteed black representation at city hall, and black representatives struggled to negotiate the
tension between rising expectations in their communities and managing
municipal affairs. Richmonders soon found out something that policy
makers and voting rights experts have known for some time—Washington often fixes one problem at the expense of creating another.20
Ultimately, this book describes how public policy shaped Richmond’s
development. If the first part of this story (chapters 1 and 2) focuses on
municipal politics in Richmond prior to annexation within the context of
the black freedom struggle, the second part (chapters 3, 4, and 5) follows
the unintended consequences of majority–minority districts and ques-
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tions more broadly what became of the civil rights movement. The latter
chapters also trace how Jim Crow–era policies shaped life in Richmond
well into the 1980s. The facts that mid-twentieth-century disinvestment
characterized many of Richmond’s black neighborhoods and that many
of these areas still nurtured poverty even at the end of the twentieth century should surprise few experts. That so little has been written about
this portion of Richmond’s history—particularly given the city’s key role
in domestic slave trading, industrial slavery, the Confederate cause, and
massive resistance—is disquieting.21
By the 1970s and 1980s, years of well-orchestrated disinvestment and
social engineering had taken its toll on a significant number of predominantly African American cities. Richmond, like most American cities, in
fact used federal and state tax money—from New Deal programs to the
block grants of the 1970s—to underwrite resegregation after the 1930s.
Prior to World War II, not only did private lenders use money from the
Federal Housing Administration to reinforce existing patterns of residential segregation, but white elites also invested this money in their own
communities at the expense of black neighborhoods. By the 1950s, Richmond’s African American neighborhoods struggled to keep pace with
their white counterparts. These neighborhoods were severely blighted,
lacked sewage drains and indoor plumbing, and suffered from poor educational facilities. As Richmond tapped the wellspring of federal largess to
clear its slums during the social engineering campaigns of the 1950s and
1960s, city officials compressed a large number of African Americans into
a handful of public-housing divisions. These divisions incubated poverty,
were in earshot of one another, and were in close proximity to downtown. As manufacturing jobs relocated to Richmond’s outlying counties
and the city transitioned toward semiprofessional, professional, and service employment, growing disparities in education and economic access
were most apparent throughout black Richmond.22 Much of the economic vulnerability that emerged during the 1980s was by design.
There was nothing exceptionally southern about mid-twentieth-century infrastructure building in Richmond. By the 1970s and 1980s, years
of systemic neglect had given rise to glaring economic vulnerability, and
this vulnerability characterized most American cities with sizeable black
populations. Local policy makers relied on many of the same urban poli-
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cies and planners that other cities employed. In fact, Richmond took the
Robert Moses approach to urban redevelopment in the attempt to address
automobile congestion, slum clearance, and public housing. Richmond’s
master plan eventually displaced tens of thousands of African Americans
and compacted them—thanks to restrictive covenants—into smaller and
smaller enclaves. Holt may have personified African Americans’ triumph
over the forces of disenfranchisement, but the public-housing resident
was also emblematic of an intensifying economic crisis. In 1970, one year
prior to Holt’s suit, the poverty rate for Richmond’s African American
families stood at nearly 25 percent (roughly 15 percent higher than the
national average), and only 16 percent of African Americans over twentyfive years old completed high school. Black neighborhoods in the capital city were more segregated by class and race in 1980 than they were
in 1960. Although the grind of twentieth-century urban history was not
inevitable, if you were poor and black in Richmond, it may have appeared
so by the mid-1980s.23
Racial redistricting may have ensured that minorities could elect black
candidates, but districts also intensified racial animosity at city hall. Shortly
after 1977, black politicians in Richmond, led by Mayor Henry Marsh,
sought to redirect service deliverables to communities that segregationists
had purposefully neglected. They also tried to secure their positions on the
city council by redrawing safer district boundaries and firing white administrators. As African American council members rejected their position as
political cue takers, however, whites argued that mayors such as Marsh,
Marion Barry, and Maynard Jackson were race leaders rather than city
managers. Richmond’s BMC found out about diplomacy the hard way—if
black politicians were to implement substantive policy changes and bring
material resources to struggling communities, they first had to fight their
way through white skepticism. They also needed to work with colleagues
from white-majority districts. These colleagues were the very white leaders
who detested racial redistricting and were often unconvinced that blacks
could do the job. African Americans may have taken control of city halls,
but they often lacked the types of private–public relationships that, according to leading urban-regime theorists, cities need to thrive.24
By the 1980s, the era of possibility was in deep jeopardy. Districts
were the price that African Americans initially paid to counter white
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backlash against the voting rights revolution. When it came to accessing
the full panoply of resources needed to govern metropolitan Richmond,
this price undeniably proved to be high. By following black mobilization to its logical conclusion, electoral empowerment and governance,
we see not only that white resistance to black governance continued to
be a defining feature of black-led city halls but that the Reagan rollbacks
exacerbated forces such as white flight and concentrated poverty. Historian Robert O. Self argues that the struggle over postwar economic
growth and metropolitan expansion in predominantly black cities represented “more than a transition from an era of possibility to an era of
limits.” These struggles personified what was at stake for America’s cities
after World War II.25
Between 1978 and 1982, members of Richmond’s city council white
minority not only threatened to bring downtown revitalization to a
standstill but also carried on the politics of paternalism and obstructionism by refusing to share power with members of the BMC. As the Reagan
administration scaled back aid to cities in the early 1980s and middle-class
residents relocated to outlying counties, a cascade of results-oriented economic pragmatism washed away black officials’ civil rights–based optimism, and these elected officials had to come to terms with a stark political
reality. City hall needed to deal with powerful business interests to address
the sharp limitations on its own authority. Even more ominously, Virginia’s rules governing city–county independence (i.e., Dillon’s Rule) meant
that Richmond had no official authority to work with its surrounding
counties without an explicit mandate from Virginia’s still largely white
and increasingly Republican General Assembly. Richmond’s BMC was no
exception to the rule when it came to meeting the challenges of urban
revitalization. Black mayors and their regimes attempted to lure investors
back into their cities by emphasizing high-profile politics—they argued
that shopping malls, convention centers, and hotels would resurrect the
dying city center. Richmond’s black politicians spent the better portion of
the 1980s manufacturing their own silver-bullet strategies. Both Henry
Marsh (in the form of Richmond Renaissance) and Richmond’s second
black mayor, Dr. Roy West (in the form of affirmative-action contracts),
believed that revitalizing downtown would reinvigorate Richmond’s tax
base, create jobs, and alleviate poverty.26
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As the BMC struggled to build its way to a better Richmond, the
problem of class became more apparent within the black body politic.
Although Richmond’s intra-racial class struggle is not emblematic of
the entire story of black governance, it contains essential qualities that
enhance our understanding of race and American political development
on the local level. If voting became a means to an end—a way to gain
community control—by the early 1980s African Americans were no longer in agreement about how to solve their communities’ problems. The
story of late-twentieth-century urban history is replete with examples of
technocratic black mayors who supplanted civil rights–era mayors. There
was nothing particularly unique about the ways Richmond’s black politicians met the challenges of urban retrenchment, declining tax bases,
white flight, high crime, deepening poverty, and fledgling schools during the 1980s. Because cities are more limited in their ability to tax than
state and federal governing bodies, public–private coalitions take special
precedent in municipal politics. Mayors such as West, Tom Bradley, and
Wilson Goode built private and public interracial coalitions by promoting
efficient government and moderating appeals to racial favoritism. Once
these middle-class black leaders, J. Phillip Thompson argues, “accepted
the practical limitations on advocacy and policy change required by their
new, often fragile, coalitions with business and white liberal reformers,”
they struggled to address the needs of vulnerable communities. Roy West
may have become the cause célèbre for Richmond’s growing black middle class when he secured 30 percent set-asides for minority contractors,
but these contracts were evidence of a more ominous rift. West, who conspired with white council members to appoint himself mayor in 1982 and
had no history of civil rights activism in Richmond, met the challenges
of municipal politics in the 1980s by working exclusively from a white
power base. The forces of intensifying black poverty and a growing black
middle class, the sociologist Eric Brown argues, “meant that the experience of racism was not as common as it had been before” and during the
civil rights era.27
Black women led the charge against pragmatic governance. During
the 1970s, Curtis Holt and a Yale-educated lawyer named Jeroyd Greene
had warned public officials that heightened residential segregation and
deepening poverty were destroying Richmond. Women, who were con-

18   The Dream Is Lost

tinuous fixtures in Richmond politics, not only became the most vocal
spokespersons against the black political establishment but also led the
way in what Laurie Greene calls the “politics of protection.” Richmond’s
murder rate per capita was second only to that of Detroit, Michigan, in
1985. Black women such as Willie Dell, who became the first female African American councilperson in Richmond in 1973, began to couch the
struggle against economic vulnerability and residential isolation as civil
rights violations. Dell and social activist Alma Marie Barlow spent the
early 1980s intentionally politicizing the fight against crime and poverty
and openly promoted the need for more pointed social welfare programs.
As the black middle class raised its standard of living by securing affirmative-action-based set-asides, these women advocated for targeted policies
that might move poor people into living-wage status. Women and their
allies not only accused the Crusade of clandestinely supporting West but
also contended that the middle-class leadership cared little about justice
for all African Americans. Redistricting eventually did Dell in—Roy West
defeated her in 1982 and 1984. And Dell’s appeals to black unity drew
fire from her district’s middle-class residents, who were preoccupied with
securing public deliverables. In mandating majority–minority districts,
federal policy makers were victims of an ecological fallacy—they assumed
that African American officials would inevitably represent their community’s political interests most effectively.28
Disillusioned by a lack of economic progress and what appeared to be
the return of control by white elites (despite the fact that blacks still held
a five-to-four council majority), many black Richmonders came to believe
that politics had failed to bring about the types of broad-based equality
that African Americans had envisioned during the civil rights movement.

